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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78A-4-103(2)(a) U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues
1.

Whether the District Court erred in its ruling that it (the trial court)

lacked jurisdiction to hear the Petitioner's Complaint (Petition) filed with the trial
court seeking a trial de novo with respect to the Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control's final order?
2.

Whether the District Court did deny Petitioner/Appellant their rights

under Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, Open Courts Provision in its
ruling that the Commission's order, dated 29th of June 2007 was not a final order
and therefore fell outside the administrative procedures act?
3.

Whether the District Court did deny Petitioners/Appellants their

rights to due process under the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 14
and Article 1 and Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution?
Standard of Review
The standard of review for issues number one of determining whether the district
court did err when it dismissed Petitioner's appeal for trial de novo for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction is one in which the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision
for correctness. Bourgeous v. State of Utah Dept. Comm., 41 P.3d 461, 463 (Ut. Ct. App.
1

2002); See also; Canfield v. Layton City, 122 P.3d 622, (2005).
The standard of review for issues number two and three is the "correctness
standard" as set forth in State ex rel. A.E., 29 P.3d 31 (2001) which the appellate court
reviews the trial court's decision for correctness.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and constitutional provisions are determinative in this
appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4;
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a);
Title 63, Chapter 46(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act;
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78A-4-103(2)(a);
Utah State Constitution, Article 1, Section 11;
Utah State Constitution, Article 1, Section 7; and
United States Constitution, 14 Amendment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
That on or about the 12 day of December, 2006, a Notice of Agency Action and
of Informal Adjudication and Notice of Hearing was filed by Respondent in the above
entitled action. (Record, page 80-82). That in the notice of agency action it was not
alleged that Respondent, Division of Alcohol and Beverage Control (hereinafter also
referred to as "DABC"), was seeking to revoke or suspend Petitioner's beer premise
license. (Record, page 80-82). That on or about January 25, 2007, Petitioner/Appellant,
2

Rugby Pub, LLC, and Petitioner, Jerald Sarafolean, did file an answer to notice of agency
action. (Record, page 86-88). That an informal hearing was held on or about January 31,
2007. That findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended action were issued on
February 5, 2007. (Record, page 20-28). That the findings of fact, conclusions of law
and recommended action were based on the hearing held January 31, 2007. That an order
was issued by the commission on or about April 27, 2007, wherein it was found that
Petitioner, Rugby Pub, LLC, was liable to pay administrative costs of $668.33 and fines
and costs totaling $1,168.33. (Record, page 15, 16). That of the $1,168.33, Jerald
Sarafolean was ordered to pay a $50.00 fine and Rugby Pub was ordered to pay a
$450.00 fine and $668.33 administrative costs were assessed to Rugby Pub, LLC.
(Record, page 15, 16). That in fact Jerald Sarafolean's brother, Thomas Sarafolean was
the one that signed the application for a beer license and on the premise beer bond.
(Record, page 31-33). That at no point in the administrative process was Thomas
Sarafolean, the person responsible on the premise beer bond, ever named by Respondent,
DABC, as a party or given notice of action against the bond. (Entire record; specifically,
record, page 46 paragraph 1, Record page 18-29, Record, page 80-82).
That Rugby Pub, LLC did close its doors on or about February 1, 2007 and did
elect not to renew its license. That an order to show cause was filed on or about June 18,
2007 seeking forfeiture of Petitioner's compliance bond and notice was given of a
hearing on such order to show case which was set for June 29, 2007. (Record, page 13,
14). That such notice was mailed on June 18, 2007 but arrived thereafter. (Record, page
13, 14). That a hearing was held on June 29, 2007 in order to determine whether there
3

was grounds to forfeit Petitioners/Appellants' compliance bond. Record, page 61).
Petitioners' attorney did object to such forfeiture based on the fact that Respondent had
not followed proper procedure for forfeiture of the compliance bond. (Record, page 74,
paragraph 8 of memorandum). That based on the proceedings from the hearing, a final
order was entered by the Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission on June 29, 2007
wherein the compliance bond was ordered forfeited to cover fines and costs. (Record,
page 61). That pursuant to such decision, Jerald Sarafolean's fine as an employee and
individual was assessed against the bond posted by Petitioner, Rugby Pub. (Record, page
61). That after the hearing on June 29, 2007, a letter was sent from the bond company to
the State of Utah indicating that they had completed investigation of the claim against
the beer bond. (Record, page 68, 69). That on or about July 27, 2007 a petition was
filed seeking judicial review of the order entered on June 29, 2007. (Record, page 1, 2, 3).
That on or about August 6, 2007, Respondent/Appellee did file an answer to petition for
judicial review of order and ruling of the Utah alcoholic control commission and request
for trial de novo. (Record, page 7-9). That on or about October 2, 2007,
Respondent/Appellee did file motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction together with a
memorandum in support thereof. (Record, page 44-70). That on or about October 2,
2007, Petitioner/Appellant did file a motion for partial summary judgment together with a
memorandum of points and authority in support thereof (Record, page 71-105). That
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment was based on arguments that
Respondent/Appellee had not followed proper procedure to attach the compliance bond.
(Record, page 71-105). That on or about October 10, 2007, Petitioner/Appellant did file
4

a memorandum of points and authority in opposition to Respondent's motion to dismiss.
(Record, page 106-144). That in such memorandum it was argued that the term "final
order" was at issue and that the order dated June 29, 2007 provide the basis for the appeal
for a trial de novo. (Record, page 106-113).
That on or about the 15th day of October, 2007, Respondent/Appelle did file a
memorandum in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment. (Record, page 144157). That on or about October 17, 2007, Petitioner/Appellant did file a reply to
memorandum in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment. (Id. at 163-165).
That on page 3 paragraph 2 of Petitioners' reply to memorandum in opposition to motion
for summary judgment, Petitioners do state that "forfeiture of the [compliance] bond
would affect the financial rights of persons or entities that were not given notice and an
opportunity to be heard and which may have voiced an objection." (Id. 165). That on or
about October 18, 2007, Respondent did file a request for hearing on pending dispositive
motions. (Id. at 161). That a hearing was scheduled on or about October 29, 2007 for
oral arguments on the dispositive motions. That at the hearing argument was presented
by the attorney for Petitioners objecting to lack of notice prior to June, 2007 and
objecting to lack of an opportunity to be heard on certain issues prior to June, 2007. (See
trial court transcript page 11, paragraphs 19-25; page 13, paragraphs 6-10, 19-25; page
14, paragraphs 1-8 and page 21, paragraphs 13-23 attached hereto and filed herewith as
Exhibit "A"). That on or about November 1, 2007 Judge Iwasaki did issue a
memorandum. (Id. at 171-174). According to the memorandum decision, the trial court
ruled that the order to show cause filed on June 18, 2007 by the Division of Alcohol and
5

Beverage Control fell outside the administrative procedures act and could not be utilized
to extend the time for appeal. Further, Judge Iwasaki did rule that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear the matter and did grant Respondent's motion to dismiss. (Id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The appeal for trial de novo was appropriate and the district court did have
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Under Utah law, a party may appeal for a trial de novo
any order constituting final agency action so long as the appeal is brought within thirty
days of the order. Utah case law defines agency action negatively as 'the whole or a
part' of any action which is not preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with
regard to a subsequent agency action of that agency or another agency. Under the test for
final agency action and the facts of this case, it is clear that the June 29, 2007 order issued
by the DABC commission was a final appealable order since the order was not
preliminary or intermediate and the administrative decision making had reached a stage
where judicial review would not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication, and rights
and obligations were determined in the June 29, 2007 order, and there appeared to be no
further agency action required or eminent.
The district court did violate the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution
found in Article I, Section 11 when it denied jurisdiction of the appeal for trial de novo.
Clearly, Utah courts have recognized that the open courts provision and due process
clause requires that litigants have their day in court and access to the court house. By
narrowly construing the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the district court did violate
the open courts provision by barring Petitioners' statutory right to judicial review of a
6

decision affecting their person, property and or reputation. The open courts provision
requires a liberal construction of statutes granting jurisdiction and the decision of the
district court should be overruled.
The due process clause of the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution
require that there be a procedural safeguard to administrative decisions. Prohibiting an
appeal after an agency action would in essence be condoning every action taken by and
administrative body after and initial order was entered. Due process mandates a judicial
review before a party can be deprived of life, liberty or property. Any decision affecting
a party's protected rights must be reviewable.
Additionally, the due process clause requires notice of the action to all interested
parties with sufficient time to prepare to meet or challenge such actions. Quite simply, in
the underlying agency decision dated June 29, 2007 no prior notice was given to one
interested party and Petitioners were given insufficient time to acquire necessary
information to defend against the on premise beer bond forfeiture. Such actions on the
part of the administrative agency were further compounded by the district court's
decision denying jurisdiction. Due process requires more before rights are affected and
the current case should be remanded for further judicial determination of the affected
interests and the parties5 rights.
ARGUMENT

7

I.

THE ORDER ENTERED ON JUNE 29, 2007 BY THE COMMISSION OF
ALCOHOL AND BEVERAGE CONTROL WAS A FINAL ORDER
APPEALABLE UNDER UTAH LAW AND THE DISTRICT COURT DID ERR
IN IT'S RULING TO DISMISS THE APPEAL FOR TRIAL DE NOVO FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION
The appeal for trial de novo filed by Petitioner/Appellant was based on a final

order and therefore the district court did have jurisdiction to hear the case. Utah code
annotated, section 78-3-4 does govern whether this Court has jurisdiction for Petitioner's
appeal. Section 78-3-4 of the Utah code provides in relevant part that courts "shall
comply with the requirements of [UAPA], in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings." More specifically, 78-3-4(7) provides that "[t]he district court has
jurisdiction to review: (a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in title 63, chapter
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that
chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings." Utah code section 63-46b14(3)(a) provides in relevant part that "[a] party shall file a petition for judicial review of
agency action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting final agency action
is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13." Clearly,
Utah law does provide for a 30 day time period in which to appeal for judicial review of
agency action.
According to the trail court's ruling, the order issued by the Division of Alcohol
and Beverage Control Commission (hereinafter referred to also as "DABC") on April 27,
2007 was the only final order from which Petitioner/Appellant could appeal and that the
order entered on June 29, 2007 did not extend the date of the appeal. Despite the
foregoing holding, it is Appellants' position that the district court did err in its ruling to
8

dismiss the case and that under Utah law, the order entered on June 29, 2007 was a final
order from which Petitioners could appeal. As demonstrated in the facts above,
following the hearing on Respondent's motion for order to show cause filed on June 18,
2007, it was determined and ordered that there were grounds to forfeit the compliance
bond posted for and on behalf of Petitioner, Rugby Pub, LLC. In essence, Petitioner did
disagree with Respondent's ability to revoke the compliance bond. Further, Petitioners
did believe that they had not been given sufficient notice of Respondent's intent to revoke
the bond. Based on the DABC's decision to revoke the compliance bond, Petitioner filed
an appeal for a trial de novo seeking judicial review of the June 29, 2007 order. Such
appeal was done on July 27, 2007, clearly, less than thirty days from the final order
issued by the Division of Alcohol and Beverage Control. Hence, the real issue before
this Court is what "constitutes final agency action" for purposes of filing an appeal under
the administrative procedures act.
In the case of Barker v. Utah Public Service Commission, 970 P.2d 702, 705
(1998) the Utah Supreme Court did recognize that "[t]he Utah Administrative
Procedures Act does not specifically define 'final agency action.' However, it does say
that an agency will contemplate reconsideration of an order only 'if the order would
otherwise constitute final agency action'." The Come in Barker went on to state that "the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act defines agency action negatively as 'the
whole or a part' of any action which is not preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or
intermediate with regard to a subsequent agency action of that agency or another
agency." Id. at 706 Under the foregoing definition of final agency action, it is clear that
9

the order issued by DABC on April 27, 2007 was not final in that it was merely a
preparatory or an intermediate order that required an order to show cause to determine
whether the compliance bond could be forfeited. Thereafter, a hearing was held in which
it was determined that the compliance bond could be forfeited. Petitioner disagreed with
such decision and filed an appeal to the district court.
In the case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 999 P.2d
17, 21 (2000) the Utah Supreme Court stated that "the appropriate test to determine
whether an agency action is final under Utah law includes three parts" (1) Has
administrative decision making reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the
orderly process of adjudication?; (2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will
legal consequences flow from the agency action?; and (3) Is the agency action, in whole
or in part, not preliminary, preparatory, procedural or intermediate with regard to
subsequent agency action?" In applying the foregoing test to the facts of the current case
it is easy to determine that the appeal by Petitioner was appropriate. First, the
administrative decision making had reached a stage where judicial review would not
disrupt the orderly process of adjudication. In other words, the appeal was not
prematurely taken. Second, the agency action on April 27, 2007 was clearly preliminary,
preparatory and intermediate in that a subsequent order to show cause was needed to
determine whether Petitioner's compliance bond could be forfeited. Had the agency
order of April 27, 2007 been the final order there would have been no need for an order
to show cause and subsequent order. Nevertheless, there was a subsequent hearing and
order which unequivocally demonstrate the intermediate and preparatory state of the
10

April 27, 2007 order. On page 7 of Respondent's memorandum in support of motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, paragraph 1, Respondent states that "[t]he
Order to Show Cause to enforce the resulting order did not commence new adjudicative
proceeding, it was simply a necessary step to complete the original." Obviously,
Respondent admits that another step was needed to complete the original action. Third,
the rights of the parties had not been completely determined in the April 27, 2007 order.
The DABC itself represented that there was still the need for an action to forfeit the
compliance bond. Accordingly, DABC filed a motion for order to show cause posing the
question of the propriety of the bond forfeiture. In and by this action, DABC did
represent that there was additional need for agency determination. Had the April 27,
2007 order been final there would have absolutely been no need for a subsequent hearing
or order.
In conclusion, the appeal for trial de novo was filed within thirty days of the order
constituting final agency action with regards to Petitioner, Rugby Pub, LLC's, compliance bond.
Therefore, Petitioner did comply with Utah Code Section 78-3-4 and with title 63, chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act and the dismissal of such appeal on the part of the district court
was done plainly in error. Such conclusion is in accordance with the publics need for a remedy
to an agency decision and this Court should overrule the district court's ruling and remand the
case for further determination.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED PETITIONERS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE
OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY RULING
THAT THE ORDER OF THE DABC COMMISSION DATED JUNE 29, 2007
WAS NOT A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER
The open courts provision of the Utah Constitution makes it clear that an
11

individual cannot be deprived of an effective remedy to protect his individual rights.
Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[a] 11 courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State." In ruling on the open courts provision of the Utah
Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court declared that "[a] plain reading of section 11 also
establishes that the framers of the Constitution intended that an individual could not be
arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights. A
constitutional guarantee of access to the courthouse was not intended by the founders to
be an empty gesture; individuals are also entitled to a remedy by 'due course of law9 for
injuries to 'person, property, or reputation'." Horton v. Goldminers Daughter, 785 P.2d
1087,1091 (Utah 1989); Citing: Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d at 675. In
addition to the foregoing declaration, the court in Horton recognized that the Utah open
courts provision "specifically guarantees, among other things, "a remedy by 'due course
of law' for injuries to 'person, property, or reputation.'" Id. 1093. Finally, the court in
Horton held unconstitutional a statute of repose applicable to architects and builders
thereby allowing a claim for relief to stand.
Certainly, the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution has specific
applications to the present case. This is particularly true where the district court's
holding did narrowly construe the term "final order" thereby depriving Petitioners of their
right to object to the order to show cause filed by the DABC and to voice objections to
12

the DABC Commission's order of forfeiture of the compliance bond. Quite simply,
under the district court's present ruling, an administrative agency would be free to take
any and all action against a person's property and rights without redress to the courts so
long as such action was taken subsequent to an initial or first order. Clearly, this holding
would lead to absurd abrogation of the rights of an individual to effective remedy. As
applied to this case specifically, the decision of the district court did deprive Jerald
Sarafolean and Rugby Pub, LLC of the right to contest the procedure used by the DABC
to attach the bond and did deprive Jerald Sarafolean's brother, Thomas Sarafolean, of his
right to object to attachment of the bond for which he was responsible. Thomas
Sarafolean was not named in any of the documents filed by Respondent, DABC, was not
formally made aware of the potential for liability and otherwise was never notified of the
proceedings against him by Respondent, DABC. Further, Thomas Sarafolean was the one
that signed the application for a beer license and the on premise beer bond. Hence, the
district court's decision effectively deprived Thomas Sarafolean and Petitioners of
redress on attachment of the compliance bond and left sole discretion of bond forfeiture
to a commission created by DABC to hear and rule on their own disputes. The foregoing
outcome could not possibly have been the intention of the legislature under the
administrative procedures act nor the open courts provision of the Utah State
Constitution.
In the case of Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 44 P.3d 663, 673 (Utah 2002) the
Utah Supreme Court stated that "both the due process clause of article I, section 7 and the
open courts provision of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that
13

litigants will have his 'day in court'." Additionally, in the case of Horton v. Goldminer's
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1094 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court did recognize a two part
test "to determine whether a statue that limits one's rights to remedy by due course of law
for injury to one's 'person, property, or reputation' violates Article I, section 11: First,
section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy 'by due course of law' for vindication of his constitutional interest.
. . . Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the
remedy or cause of action may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil
to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means of achieving the objective."

In this case there is no alternative

remedy provided by law for disputing the commission's decision on attachment of the
bond except raising the issue before the district court. The district court's narrow
application of the administrative procedures act and narrow definition of the term "final
agency action" left Petitioners and Thomas Sarafolean with no alternate remedy to
challenge the commission's decision to forfeit their bond. Further, under the holding in
Horton, when there is no alternative remedy, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action
may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing remedy is not arbitrary or unreasonable means of achieving the
objective. In the present case, there does not appear to be a clear economic evil to be
eliminated. At least under the facts of the present case, no clear economic evil was eluded
to by Respondent or in the findings issued by Judge Iwasaki. Therefore, Judge Iwasaki's
narrow interpretation of the administrative procedures act appears to violate the open
14

courts provision of the Utah Constitution by depriving Petitioners of a remedy at law to
challenge the DABC commission's decision to forfeit the bond.
Based on the foregoing authority and the facts of this case, Petitioners urge this
Court to hold that Judge Iwasaki's interpretation of the administrative procedures act and
interpretation of what constitutes "final action" be overruled under the Utah open courts
provision and that this case be remanded for further hearing before the district court.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID DENY PETITIONERS/
APPELLANTS THEIR RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT 14, AND
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY
DISMISSING THEIR APPEAL.

A. Due Process Requires the Opportunity for Judicial Review of an Administrative
Decision.
The district court's dismissal of Petitioners' appeal for trial de novo did violate
their rights to due process.

The right to due process of law is set forth in Article I,

Section 7 of the Utah Constitution which provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law." Also, the XIV Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides in relevant part that "[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." In accordance with the foregoing provisions of the Utah and United States
Constitution the Utah Supreme Court in Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663, 673674 (Utah 2002), has ruled that "[p]arties to a suit, subject to all valid claims and
defenses, are constitutionally entitled to litigate any justiciable controversy between them
15

i.e., they are entitled to their day in court. Both the due process clause of article I, section
7 and the open courts provision of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantee
that litigants will have 'his day in court5." See also, Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796,
799 (Utah 1998) ("even the most limited reading of [the open courts] provision
guarantees a day in court to all parties . . . in disputed insurance claims). The Utah
Supreme Court in Miller went on to state "[tjhis constitutional right to a day in court is
the 'right and opportunity, in a judicial tribunal, to litigate a claim, seek relief, or defend
one's rights'." Quoting; Blacks Law Dictionary 402 (7th ed. 1999). Additionally, the
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n,
657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), recognized that "[njeither a court nor other judicial tribunal
may deny a person a constitutional right or deprive such person of a vested interest in
property without any opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking of property
without due process of law. Many attempts have been made to further define "due
process" but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day in court-that
is each party shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the privilege
of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his defense, after which
comes judgment upon the record thus made." The court in the Celebrity Club case held
unconstitutional a statue which denied a business owner the right to appeal to the district
court a decision involving its liquor license.
The rulings set forth in the Miller and Celebrity Club cases clearly demonstrate
that Utah law favors the opportunity to be heard before a judicial tribunal. Along the
same lines as the holding in Miller and Celebrity Club, numerous court in other
16

jurisdictions have held that due process is satisfied where there is judicial review of
administrative decisions. For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals in the case of
Wecker v. TBL Excavating, Inc., 908 P.2d 1186 (Colo. App. 1995) held that "[judicial
review of the decision of an administrative agency which affects substantial statutory
rights is constitutionally required." The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit stated that "[i]t is the law of this Circuit that a state provides adequate due process
when it provides 'reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a local administrative
body9." Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128 (3rd Cir. 1988). See also; John E.Long,
Inc. v. Borough of Ringwood, 61 F. Supp.2d 273 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding State furnishes
constitutionally adequate procedural due process when it provides reasonable remedies to
correct legal error by local administrative body). The United State District Court for
Pennsylvania in Rumph v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 964 F.Supp. 180? 188 (E.D. Pa.
1997), recognized that "[a]n administrative appeal mechanism followed by judicial
review is constitutionally sufficient." The Texas Court of Appeals in Texas Employment
Com'n v. Remington York, 948 S.W.2d 352, 358 (Tex App. 1997), stated that "[t]here is
no violation of due process if provision is made for a trial de novo in the district court on
issue passed upon by an administrative board." Finally, article VIII, section 5 of the Utah
Constitution, provides, in part, that "there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause."
As outlined herein, there is ample authority which would indicate that judicial
review of an administrative agency is an essential element of the due process clause.
Clearly, the facts of the present case indicate that the district court may have invoked
17

jurisdiction had it interpreted ' final agency action' to include action taken on the
compliance bond. Petitioners maintain that such decision affected the property rights and
obligations of themselves as well as Thomas Sarafolean an un-named third party listed on
the compliance bond itself. Therefore, due process would dictate that judicial review of
any decision affecting this bond is necessary. Further, article VIII, section 5 of the Utah
Constitution specifically provides for an appeal right. For the reasons set forth herein,
Petitioner's urge this Court to overrule the district court's decision denying jurisdiction
over the appeal for trial de novo.
B. Due Process Requires Notice and An Opportunity to be Heard in a Meaningful
Manner By An Impartial Fact Finder.
While it is recognized that an administrative agency may issue an order affecting
the rights of individuals, such order must comply with due process and all parties must be
given an opportunity to prepare and be heard. As set forth above in the 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, the law
requires that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or property interest without due
process of law. In ruling on the due process clause, the Utah Supreme Court has stated
that "every significant deprivation, whether permanent or temporary, of an interest, which
is qualified as 'property' under the due process clause must be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case, absent extraordinary or
unusual circumstances." Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept, 616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah
1980). In further defining the requirements of due process, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated that "[i]n most instances, the guarantee of due process prohibits the enforcement of
18

a money judgment against a person who has not been designated a party or served with
process." Brigham Young University v. Tremco, 156 P.3d 782, 789 (Utah 2007).
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211
(1983) recognized that:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to
make their appearance. Many cases have held that where notice is
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the
proceedings against him or not given sufficiently in advance of the
proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived of due process.
Under due process considerations, Petitioners complain of three facts which
deprived them of due process of law when they were denied a hearing before the district
court. First, the original motion by DABC for order to show cause dated June 18, 2007,
which was scheduled for hearing on June 29, 2007, did not give Petitioners time to
address issues related to the compliance bond. Obviously, less than ten days is not
enough time to contact an out of State bonding company. Such fact was made evident by
the letter from the bonding company to the State of Utah dated after the hearing,
indicating they had concluded their review of coverage issues. Petitioners should have
been granted time to obtain a copy of the bond terms prior to any determination on
forfeiture. As stated above, due process requires notice to interested parties and adequate
time to prepare.
The second concern raised by Petitioners in this appeal is that there was no notice

19

of intent to attach the compliance bond given to the financially responsible party, namely,
Thomas Sarafolean. As the terms of the compliance bond indicate, Thomas Sarafolean
is the financially responsible for the compliance bond.

This is relevant to this appeal

because the compliance bond posted on behalf of the entity "rugby pub" was attached by
the DABC to pay for the violation of Jerald Sarafolean, as an employee and individual.
Clearly, Thomas Sarafolean should have been afforded the opportunity to object to the
payment of Jerald Sarafolean's fine and the Rugby Pub should have been given the
chance to address coverage issues of employees under the terms of the bond.
(emphasis added). The complete lack of respect for due process was compounded after
the district court held there would be no trial de novo, thereby leaving Petitioners with
zero opportunity to address coverage issues and the rights and obligations of third parties
under the bond. Had the appeal for trial de novo been accepted, all issues regarding third
party liability, bond coverage, and fine schedules could have been adequately addressed.
Failure to allow such appeal was an abrogation of due process of law based on notice and
opportunity to prepare.
Finally, Petitioners complain that there is a conflict of interest in the DABC
Commission making a decision regarding Petitioners' request for a continuance and on
their order revoking the bond. Conflict is rife where a commission created by the same
agency seeking enforcement has final decision making power. The Utah Supreme Court
has stated that "[o]ne of the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties to a
case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge." Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah,
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696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1995). Under the facts of this case, there is the undeniable
and essential need for an unbiased third party to make a decision in this case. Quite
plainly, administrative remedies are inadequate and denial of Petitioners' right to appeal
the matter to the district court deprived them of their due process. For these reasons and
those set forth above, it is abundantly clear that this case should be remanded for
consideration of the appeal for trial de novo.

CONCLUSION
In accordance with Utah law, the district court did have jurisdiction over the
appeal of the June 29, 2007 order issued by the DABC. In addition to a wrongful
application of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Petitioners' rights under the Utah
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution and the due process clause of the United
States and Utah Constitutions were violated when their appeal requesting judicial review
of agency action was dismissed without a hearing. For the reasons set forth herein,
Petitioners urge this Court to remand this case for further judicial determination of the
rights duties and obligations of the parties.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l*f

day of MJ^^OH

, 2008.

DOUGLAS A. GUBLER, #7212
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 274-2333

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing appellate brief was
served upon the Respondent/Appellee's attorney by placing a copy of the same in the
United States Post Office, postage pre paid addressed to the following address:
SHEILA PAGE, #4898
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEF, #4666
Attorney General
P.O. Box 140857
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone : (801) 366-0353
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee

DATED this _W_ day of March, 2008.
/

fa*&C*7 <3 X O M -

DDUGLAS A. GUBLER
Attorney for Petitioners/Appellants

22

Appendix

Exhibit A
(Trial Court Transcript)

23

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RUGBY PUB, LLC, et al.,

Case No. 070910861 AA

Plaintiffs,

Appellate Case No. 20070955-CA

v

DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL
BEVERAGE, et al.,
Defendants.

With Keyword Index

MOTION TO DISMISS OCTOBER 29, 2007
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

Exhibit "A"

COPY

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

DOUGLAS A. GUBLER
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

SHEILA PAGE
Assistant Attorney General
* * *

ORAL ARGUMENTS
Ms. Page
Mr.Gubler
RULING TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT

Page
2, 22
10,26

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - OCTOBER 29, 2007

2

HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4
5

THE COURT:
Control, 070910861.

- of the Department of Alcohol Beverage
Appearances please?

6

MR. GUBLER:

7

Rugby Pub and Gerald Sarafolean.

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. PAGE:

10

Sheila Page, Assistant Attorney General,

THE COURT:

Thank you, Ms. Page.

An attorney

without their file is like one without their pen.

13

MS. PAGE:

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. PAGE:

16

Thank you, Mr. Gubler.

for the Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control.

11
12

Doug Gubler on behalf of petitioners,

Well, Do you want us to wait?
Actually, I do have some - my argument

wasn't prepared here.

17

THE COURT:

All right.

18

MS. PAGE:

19

THE COURT:

20

This is before the Court on respondent's Motion to

I think we can go ahead.
Okay, very well.

Thank you, Ms. Page.

21

Dismiss.

The Court is appreciative and acknowledges the

22

courtesy copies that have been provided to the Court.

23

They're always helpful to me.

24

matters which have been briefed, which have not been argued,

25

will be considered by the Court.

Rest assured that those

I think the Court has the

arguments in mind.
This is your motion, Ms, Page.

You have the

record.
MS. PAGE:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

You are stating a procedural defect,

and, therefore, there's no jurisdiction to - for the Court to
hold this matter.

Is that one of your points?

MS. PAGE:
THE COURT:
MS. PAGE:

That's correct, Your Honor.
All right.
Yes.

Can you expand on that?

The - I think the primary issues

center around whether or not the order of April 27th was a
final order or not.

I don't think that this Court would

consider any of its orders - making judgment to be anything
less than a final order and expect that it would be complied
with.

The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control - in

particular, the commission issued an order and - which it
expected a licensee to follow.

That order went unchallenged

by the respondents in the case below, and - but they also
failed to pay the fines and the costs that were ordered by
the commission.

At such time, the department took action to

recoup those costs and also to get the fine.
The April 27th order complies in every way with the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act.

In particular, this -

the provisions that an order be final before it be judicially
challenged, and that a respondent be given the opportunity to

1

know that they have a right to either seek administrative

2

review before the agency, or - and/or judicial review, and

3

those things are contained in that order.

4

It was never challenged in a timely fashion, and we believe

5

that their - it did constitute the final order of the

6

department on the disciplinary actions that were adjudicated

7

before a hearing officer finding fault with both Rugby Pub

8

and Gerald Sarafolean, the owner and an employee.

9

That order stands.

When the advisor got paid, the costs were not paid.

10

The department took action on the bond.

And in this case, I

11

think it's important for you to look at the actual terms of

12

the bond.

13

the department.

14

only the laws, and the statutes, and the rules, but also the

15

orders of the commission.

The bond are such that they ran specifically to
If the licensee failed to comply with not

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. PAGE:

Okay.
And based on that, the department did

18

make claim on the bond, gave notice to the defendant that

19

they were going to seek forfeiture through the bonding

20

company, and an order to show case was held pursuant to the

21

rules of the department.

22

THE COURT:

And that is the basis for petitioner's

23

motion for partial summary judgment, and I'm glad that you

24

brought that up, cause I want your best argument as to

25

opposition of that too, and I'm - and you're getting to it, I

know.

But as to these arguments, I want your best argument

in support of your positions and opposition to the opposing
side, and that'll be your argument.

So as much as you want

to argue your motion in support or your opposition of a
partial summary judgment, now's your time.
MS. PAGE:

Thank you.

The Administrative Procedures Act doesn't address
in specificity what happens if an order of a administrative
agency is not followed.

Subsection 46(b) (19) only provides

that you can go to the district court.

It does not cut off

any avenues short of going to the district court to get your
orders complied with.

The department requires bonds of its

licensees to make sure that any outstanding fines, fees, etc.
are covered by the department, so that the department's not
left holding the bag.
In this particular instance, the - as I said, the
outcome is a beer bond, which was filed by the licensee in
this matter.

It granted specifically to violations of the

law.
THE COURT:

And your position is that by terms of

conditions of the bond, itself it is explicit in that it is
for the payment of fines, or fees, or costs that are
associated with noncompliance of commission orders?
MS. PAGE:
THE COURT:

Yes.
And contrasted by Mr. Gubler's position

1

that there need to be a revocation first before you can work

2

on - before you can look to the bond for remedies?

3

MS. PAGE:

And in this particular - there are bonds

4

out there that do not state exactly what this bond said is my

5

understanding.

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. PAGE:

8

Uh-huh (affirmative).
And the statute does deal about - deal

specifically in terms of revocations and bonds.

9

THE COURT:

10

MS. PAGE:

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. PAGE:

And that's 81-1-6?
Right.
Okay.
Well, and not just 81-1-6, but the bonds

13

- each section of the - each Alcoholic Beverage Control Act

14

deals with specific licensees, and they each require a bond,

15

and the bonds are somewhat addressed in there.

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. PAGE:

18

Okay.
If I could direct your attention to 32A-

10-205 -

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. PAGE:

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. PAGE:

32?
A-10-205.
Thank you.
And it requires a bond and sets the

23

amount of the bond at $2,000, and talks about what happens if

24

it's negligent, and whether there has to be faithful

25

compliance of the type of the rules of the commission.

And

it also provides that if there is a revocation, the bond may
be forfeited.

I don't think that that is limiting to the

department that only in the terms of revocation of license
could you forfeit the bond because if there's revocation of
license, there's generally no other penalty which would
require access to that bond.

There are not usually fines.

There may be costs, but not usually fines.
THE COURT:

In your reply brief - and correct me if

I'm wrong, and I know that you will - didn't you mention the
fact that while we haven't yet revoked, which you have to
concede.
MS. PAGE:
THE COURT:

Right.
That that's just an almost pro forma

under the circumstances?
MS. PAGE:

Well, and in the facts of this

particular case, you've got both issues.

You've got a bond,

which clearly runs to the benefit of the department if
there's violations of the commission's orders, and you also
have the fact that revocation, given the facts of this
particular case are - would, in fact, be pro forma, because
the have chosen to go out of business.
THE COURT:
MS. PAGE:

Yeah.
And so you have taking actions of both -

to either suspend or revoke the license would be an exercise
in not necessarily futility, because I think they have a

1

legal consequence to them, but that consequence is more grave

2

to the licensee than it is to the harm of the public.

3

THE COURT:

And choosing to go out of business,

4

they - does that mean that their license is revoked?

5

they have their license even though they're in or out of

6

business to be renewed or something like that -

7

MS. PAGE:

8

THE COURT:

Don't

Correct.
- rather than a revocation?

So isn't

9

it necessary to have a process specifically for revocation,

10

rather than to rely upon the fact that they've closed their

11

doors.

12

MS. PAGE:

Well, in this case, they were so far

13

passed the renewal period, that they would have to reapply

14

for new licensure.

15 I

THE COURT:

16

MS. PAGE:

Okay.
So the revocation at this point in time

17

would simply keep Mr. Sarafolean from applying for a license

18

for 36 months.

19
20

And given the nature of the violation -

THE COURT:

And the fact that it's lapsed, can he

reapply at any time without that burden of revocation?

21

MS. PAGE:

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. PAGE:

Yes, he can.
Okay.
So we have, in fact, a case here where

24

not only have - I think Mr. Sarafolean benefitted from the

25

fact that revocation was not sought in this matter, but you
7

have a bonding company, which investigated the matter, found
the department's actions to comply with the terms of the
bond, and have paid on it.
Most recently, - well, rather than to get into that
issue, I want to address the fact that, again, the commission
must have a method to enforce its own actions, and the
judgment was no less final at that point in time than it
would be if it came from this very court.

The fact that

people do not comply with the court's orders, only give rise
to later proceedings, which are inherent in the powers of the
court, and inherent in the powers of the commission to make
sure that all orders are - if we come to this court, and I
have in another matter gone to the district court and
requested compliance, that the court require that the
licensee comply with the orders, but they were not monetary
orders.

They were other orders that affected public issues,

and would be more appropriate to the powers of this Court in
enforcing of the administrative orders of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Commission.
THE COURT:
MS. PAGE:

All right.
Now, as to the issue of petitioner's

motion for partial summary judgment, the facts are not there's no line of dispute about the facts.

What the law is

that effects those facts is - and whether they have any legal
ramifications.

Mr. Gubler in his - both his pleadings and in

1

his - and in our conversations have indicated they felt they

2

were treated badly the first time through, and they're upset

3

about the April 27th order.

4

considered, you know, permanent and dead and buried.

5

That issue has got to be

The secondary issue is what effect the commission's

6

later order to enforce its own earlier order would have, and

7

I don't think that there are - there's a lot of dispute in

8

the facts.

9

judgment?

Again, is he entitled to partial summary
I don't believe he is because I don't think this

10

Court has jurisdiction.

11

can be made is that Mr. Sarafolean has gone to great lengths

12

to avoid paying a debt that he owed, and it would not be

13

incumbent upon this Court to try and enforce that.

14

But the best argument I think that

Also, Mr. Gubler has brought up in his reply memo

15

that I received last week an indication that he feels that

16

there are necessary parties that haven't been brought into

17

this proceeding, and I don't know who those parties are.

18

moves to them, but he doesn't say who those parties could

19

possibly be.

20

his remedy does lie in contract.

21

review of the administrative order, and that's the route that

22

he should have followed with his client's legal interests

23

rather than coming before this Court for judicial review.

24
25

If they are, in fact, the bonding company, then

THE COURT:
positions.

He

It doesn't lie in judicial

Let me restate my understanding of your

You first position is those should be dismissed

1

for lack of jurisdiction because there was a question as to

2

the final order in this matter and the application of that.

3

If I deny that and say I do have jurisdiction, then your

4

other position is, by virtue of the language of the bond,

5

itself, there is need - no need to take the position that he

6

is taking - that Mr. Gubler has taken on behalf of

7

petitioner, because there's no need for a revocation prior to

8

looking toward the bond for a satisfaction, because the

9

language in, itself, of the bond is for - to make payments

10

for fines, and costs, and fees pursuant to failure to comply

11

with commission orders.

12

MS. PAGE:

13

THE COURT:

Yes.
And then finally at the very end, you

14

are - your position is even if you deny my motions, you

15

cannot grant their motions for partial summary judgment

16

because of the conflicting statutory - or conflicting rules

17

that may be applicable to the assessment of costs or fees.

18

MS. PAGE:

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. PAGE:

21

understand it well.

Yes.
Have I stated your position correctly?
You have, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT:

23

Mr. Gubler?

24

MR. GUBLER:

I think you

Thank you very much, Ms. Page.

Your Honor, I find it interesting that

25 J Ms. Page eludes to the fact that the ability to attach this
10

1

bond is contractual in nature based on the fact that they

2

filed an order to show cause in order to have it determined

3

by the commission whether it was appropriate to attach that

4

bond.

5

present an argument for appeal based on the April order.

6

That was in part due to finances and the fact that my client,

7

Mr. Sarafolean, who she claims has gone to great lengths to

8

avoid paying the fine, was fined $50.

9

schedule, which is set - the penalty schedule which is set

We didn't have an argument, although - or we didn't

I think over the fine

10

forth in Rule 81 that for a first occurrence involving a

11

minor violation, there is no fine whatsoever which they state

12

is applicable to a first violation.

13

their own rules promulgated, they fined my client.

14

willing to accept that based on finances, because the cost of

15

an appeal would exceed the fine that was assessed to my

16

client and was not in accordance with the rules promulgated

17

by the commission.

18

let that go.

19

Nonetheless, outside
We were

So that was our first contention when we

Our next contention was that after they had

20

assessed exorbitant fines and fees outside the rules to my

21

client, they went ahead and sent out a notice on an order to

22

show cause to attach the bond, and that bond was signed for

23

by a separate individual, not Gerry Sarafolean.

24

signed for, and his obligation to pay was contractual to

25

Thomas Sarafolean, Mr. Gerry Sarafolean's brother.

It was

So the
11

fact THE COURT:

So is there a third party beneficiary

somewhere around here that is not Rugby Pub or Sara - or your
client.

I mean MR. GUBLER:
THE COURT:

cover somebody.

Well, there's
- the bond is posted for a reason to

Are you saying it doesn't cover any of the

people?
MR. GUBLER:
THE COURT:
MR. GUBLER:

It was suppose to cover the Rugby Pub.
Okay.
And so not to cover Gerry Sarafolean,

who was an employee of the Rugby Pub.

What the commission

did was they gathered all the fines that had been assessed of
the Rugby Pub and the employee for his actions.

And they

said the Rugby Pub's bond is going to pay for all of those,
including the individuals, who was Gerry Sarafolean.
what they did, is they lumped that together.

And so

And they say,

we're going to take the whole bond to pay for Mr.
Sarafolean's breach of his duty to wear a badge - or the
allegations, which incidentally, are outside the rules that
they promulgated themselves to even assess him a fine at all
- and we're going to attach that bond, and we're going to
make the signer of that bond financially responsible for it,
and that is Thomas Sarafolean.
Now, I find it interesting that they would do that,
12

1

because they started sending letters out to the bond company

2

and to the person responsible who had signed on the bond in

3

June, in the middle part of June.

4

on June 8th to Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland saying

5

that they were going to attach the bond.

6

And they sent a letter out

My client - well, Thomas Sarafolean didn't get

7

notice of that until much later.

But once he got notice that

8

he was going to be financially responsible for not only the

9

actions of Rugby Pub but for Gerald Sarafolean, he said, hey,

10

I've got a right to be heard on this.

This is my property.

11

Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.

12

Therefore, I was contacted.
On June 20th, I sent a letter out to the bond

13
14

company.

And I said, first of all, let me have a copy of the

15

bond so I know what contractually Thomas Sarafolean is

16

obligated to pay.

17

very little time to be able to receive any documents from the

18

bonding company, I asked for a continuance of - on the order

19

to show cause which was denied.

20

copy of my letter to the bonding company, but it wasn't until

21

after the hearing - well, after the hearing that I was given

22

a copy of the contract on the bond to be able to determine

23

whether Mr. Thomas Sarafolean had any objections, and whether

24

contractually he is the signer that was obligated to pay for

At that same time on June 20th, leaving me

I could provide the Court a

25 [ the actions of Gerry Sarafolean, the employee.
13

And this is precisely why I think the legislature
has enacted this is that it needs to be a final agency
action. In this particular case, it was not final.

And the

reason that I deem it not to be final, and my clients will
argue the same, is the fact that it involved a third party
who had signed on the bond and not been given notice at the
other hearings that he was going to have to cough up some
money in order to pay for the fines that had been assessed.
And so from there, we filed the appeal.

And I think that

it's clear based on the fact that the agency issued an order,
which was the order saying, yeah, you can go ahead and revoke
the bond, and that was the final order issued by the division
on June 29th of 2007.

I can provide a copy of that to you if

you'd like.
THE COURT:
MR. GUBLER:

Sure.

Thank you, Mr. Gubler.

And I think as I read the statute and

the case law, the case law in Barker provides that final
agency action has not been divided per statute, and so
they've gone on and that - and the Railroad case to define
what is final agency action, and they've pointed out the
test.

They've enunciated it.

In fact, as - I'll direct the

Court, Barker v. Utah Public Services Commission.

The

Supreme Court recognized and stated that the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act does not specifically define
final agency action.

However, it does say that an agency
14

1

will contemplate in reconsideration of an order only if the

2

order would otherwise constitute a final agency action.

3

think what they're - they were stating in the Barker case is

4

you can't prematurely appeal the case to the district court

5

unless all proceedings have been finalized.

6

you jumping the gun, even if you feel like your rights are

7

being taken advantage of by administrative agency.

8
9

We don't want

They were wrong to state that the model state
Administrative Procedure Act defines agency action negatively

10

as the whole or a part of any action which is not

11

preliminary, preparatory procedural, or intermediate with

12

regard to a subsequent agency action of that agency or

13

another.

14

So I

This - the one - the action taken on April 27th was

15

clearly intermediary, because they sought an order to show

16

cause saying, hey, do we have grounds to take this bond?

17

They weren't sure, and so they filed an order to show cause,

18

and the sole purpose of the order to show cause was to

19

determine whether it was appropriate to attach the bond.

20

At that point, that triggered a series of events

21

notifying the bonding company, who in turn notified Thomas

22

Sarafolean of the fact that he was going to have to cough up

23

some money.

24

not appropriate.

25

they fined us where under their own rules, there's no

And based on that, my client said, well, that's
We're - we've had enough.

First of all,

15

provision for a fine, but it was a minor fine.

It was 50

bucks, even though they assessed a bunch of costs that were
exorbitant, my client right now, cause the order just said,
well, I guess I'll just have to eat the fine.

But after they

lumped that fine together with the fine of the Rugby Pub and
told another individual that he was going to have to pay both
the individual fine assessed to an individual and the Rugby
Pub, he said, "I've had enough.

That's not my obligation,

and I have the right to appeal that", which we did.
And I think that the standard which is set out in
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission is
appropriate.

They state the appropriate test to determine

whether an agency action is final under Utah law becomes
three parts.

Number one, has the administrative decision

making reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt
the orderly process of adjudication?

So we've got to wait

til they've issued findings of fact, and an order, and some
other things to determine whether it's appropriate to take
that on appeal, which clearly we did in this case.
Number two, have the rights or obligations been
determined, or will legal consequences flow from the agency
action?

And so in this case, we're saying the rights and

obligations have not been determined on the April 27th order.
There was one more order that needed to be determined to find
out what obligations and duties would be imposed on a third
16

1

party.

That required another hearing, which they had which I

2

came to, and I objected to.

3

commission.

4

revoked, and clearly stated that due process requires more or

5

less an opportunity to be heard.

6

go to the letter that was sent out by the commission, they

7

were sent out to Thomas Sarafolean on June 11th.

8

was set for the - I believe the 19th - 18th.

9

Thomas Sarafolean was going to be responsible for the payment

I read the rule to the

I stated our grounds for not wanting that bond

Which incidentally, if you

The hearing

So on June 11th,

10

on the bond, and he gets a letter stating that, hey, we've

11

decided to attach the bond for payment of $1,168.

12

the right to be heard on that.

13

to run and get a copy of the bond from the bonding company,

14

and appear at the hearing, and make any objections he has to

15

that.

16

they said no way, which either violated due process in and of

17

itself.

18

just following any kind of rules they want.

19

own - they have a violation schedule they don't follow, and

20

then they send out notices to attach a bond without giving a

21

person the appropriate - any amount of time to object to it.

22

And when we ask for a continuance they say denied.

23

provide lists from - and I wrote a letter to the bonding

24

company on the 20th.

25

27th order was not final.

So I got called.

You've got

He's got less than seven days

I asked for a continuance, which

It's another example, I think, of the commission
They file their

I can

And so our position is, that the April
In fact, in their response
17

1

memorandum, they admit that it was transitory, that it was an

2

order issued in transition to a determination as to whether

3

the bond could be attached, and we have great problems with

4

the bond.

5

grant of authority, the only provision in there which talks

6

about attachment of a bond states that if a permit or license

7

is revoked, a condition precedent, if - then why occurred.

8

They have to ask them why it occurs.

9

legislatures is saying, only in grave cases if we're going

First of all, under the Utah Code, the legislative

In other words, the

10

after your license, can we revoke the bond.

11

commission made order the revocation of any compliance bond

12

posted by the committee or licensee.

13

THE COURT:

And the

Now, -

Now, who is the - what is the fact, if

14

it is a fact, that your client has shut the doors.

They have

15

waived - they have - Ms. Page has indicated there has been -

16 I time has passed for them to renew it, and so they would have
17

to make a re-application - in effect, a revocation in and of

18

itself.

19

have - or those representations have?

20

What effect, if any, in your opinion do those facts

MR. GUBLER:

Well, the fact of the matter is, they

21

never - in fact, within their penalty range for a mild -

22

minor and moderate violation, it doesn't provide for

23

attachment of a bond or even license revocation.

24

an option for the penalties that were alleged against the

25

Rugby Pub and the individual, Gerry Sarafolean.

That's not

18

THE COURT:
MR. GUBLER:

All right.
So first of all, in our opinion under

the legislative mantle of authority, which I think rules over
the administrative rules which were promulgated by the
Division of Alcohol and Beverage Control, it states, number
one, that if you go after the license, then you can attach
the bond.

And we're saying that, yes, it does have an impact

on that fact that we closed - that the Rugby Pub closed its
doors because they're saying we don't have any more money,
and we're going out of business, and we can't pay our bills.
And so I think that it - it has an impact in that it clearly
demonstrated that there was someone that was saying, hey,
look, financially, I've had enough.

I can't pay anymore.

And so the fact that they come after - they voluntarily
relinquished the license and say, you know what?
to take the bond.

We're going

I think is unfair to the person who signed

on the bond.
THE COURT:

So your position is similar to what Ms.

Page may have mentioned in argument, that if there's a bond
revocation, that's usually the end of the story?
MR. GUBLER:

Yeah - but well, I don't know, because

sometimes the bond revocation is temporary.

It's for 15

days, and then there's some provisions in the code which
state that, you know, they can - or the license, not the
bond.

Excuse me.

That sometimes the license revocation is
19

1

temporary.

2

license which allows us to go after your bond, then we put

3

you out of business for a few days.

4

It's a penalty that's going to protect the public.

5

don't see - my clients have voluntarily said, we're not going

6

to renew our license, which is a protection to the public.

7

There's no fear that they're going to re - be a repeat

8

offense of that.

9
10

So if they say, we're going to go after your

THE COURT:

MR. GUBLER:

12

THE COURT:

14
15

Well, I

So your representation is, they have

voluntarily relinquished everything by virtue of -

11

13

Make you think about it.

Well, they - shutting down and not asking for a

renewal?
MR. GUBLER:

They just said, what, we're not going

to renew it.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. GUBLER:

Okay.
But our biggest problem is, the only

18

authority that they elude to which would give them the

19

ability to attach that bond legally under the statute would

20

be under their rules, which were promulgated by the

21

commission, which is Rule 81-1-6, but that even talks about

22

the fact that they've got to go after the bond.

23

under (e) it says, "Failure of the licensee or permitee to

24

pay a fine or administrative costs within 30 days of the

25

initial date established by the commission shall result in

It says

20

1

issuance of an order to show cause.

2

permit should not be revoked, and the licensee's or

3

permittee's compliance bond forfeited."

4

after the legislature has stated that there was a condition

5

precedent for going after the bond, which is you've got to go

6

after the license.

7

the license.

8
9

Right of the license or

So even in that,

It's got to be serious enough to go after

Then they promulgate their own rules which say, you
know, number one, you've got to go - your license or permit

10

can be revoked, and then we can attach your bond.

Never -

11

this is the main point also is never did they say we're going

12

after your license or permit, and that predates the time when

13

they voluntarily relinquished it.

14

going to go after your bond, and they never said we're going

15

to go after your license.

16

I'm going to be financially on the hook for the acts of Gerry

17

Sarafolean, and that's our forum.

18

requires notice to all interested parties.

19

bond triggered notice to a party, but he really didn't have

20

an opportunity to be heard.

21

want to appeal it.

22

assessed was outside their own agency rules, and we object to

23

it vehemently because they're going - they're treating us

24

unfairly, and then they're assessing a whole bunch of

25

administrative costs to us.

They never said we're

And so Tommy Sarafolean never said

I think that due process
Revocation of the

And at that point he said, I

I don't like it.

In fact, the fine

21

1

So that's our position.

We think that they admit

2

that it was a transitory order, April 27th.

3

theirselves, that was only something preparatory to revoking

4

the bond, and that's exactly what the Barker case state and

5

the Union Pacific case states and, therefore, under the clear

6

definition provided by our Supreme Court, we're allowed to

7

take an appeal - 30 days.

They state

8

THE COURT:

9

Contrary to my initial remarks, I'm going to allow

10

both sides, if they wish to, a brief rebuttal if you want to

11

finish it.

12
13

MS. PAGE:

Thank you, Mr. Gubler.

Thank you, Your Honor.

I do have

several things I'd like to address.

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. PAGE:

Very well.
First of all, this is the first time

16

I've heard the name Thomas Sarafolean in this case.

Mr.

17

Gubler did not appear before the commissioner to indicate

18

that he was representing Mr. Thomas Sarafolean, but Gerald

19

Sarafolean and Rugby Pub.

20

on behalf of Gerald - of Thomas Sarafolean.

21

appearing in any of the pleadings, and I did a registered

22

principal search on Rugby Pub.

23

relationship to this company that we can tell.

24

Sarafolean is the principal and the registered agent.

25

Gerald Sarafolean is the only one who's every appeared on

He has not entered an appearance
His name isn't

Thomas Sarafolean has no
Gerald
Mr.

22

behalf of Rugby Pub.

The fact that Mr. Thomas Sarafolean may

have signed on the bond is totally irrelevant to the - I
think these proceedings.

It's no different than if you walk

in and pay a cash bond for your son.
the benefit of that person.

The bond is still for

The beneficiary in this case is

Gerald Sarafolean and his business, Rugby Pub.
The - in no shape or form, I think, did I ever
refer to the order to show cause as a transitory position.

I

think what I did say, and if not, clearly I would state it
here for Your Honor is that it didn't trigger a new
proceeding, a new adjudicated proceeding at the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act.

It was an order in

furtherance of the earlier case, which should have been over
and done with by the payment of the fines and costs as were
ordered by the department.
Again, I don't think Mr. Gubler on behalf of either
of Mr. Sarafolean can - to - can challenge that April 27th
order.

It was final.

the order.

I can refer you to the last page of

"Respondents have the right to seek judicial

review of this order within 30 days from the date of order in
the district court in accordance with Utah Code Annotated,
§63-46(b) 14, 15, and 17, and 18, and 32(a) 1, 119, and 120,"
and I can tell you that those are the judicial review
sections of both UAPA and the admini - and the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act.

In every way, shape, or form, this was
23

1
2

a final order.
Now, the other issue would be - excuse me.

I've

3

lost my train of thought.

Oh, the fines were due well in

4

advance of June.

5

department, once those fines were past due, started looking

6

at how they were going to get the matter paid.

7

that I think they've taken great effort in trying to work

8

with the respondents in getting them to pay what is due from

9

them and to give everyone adequate notice because quite

They were due in May, and, of course, the

I have to say

10

honestly, they don't have to revoke very many bonds.

Most

11

people will pay them or they will voluntarily surrender the

12

bond and indicate we don't have the cash to do that.

13

idea that people are temporarily revoked for a period of time

14

is new and foreign to me, and I've been representing the

15

department for three years now.

16

permanent acts, and they do trigger some very onerous, long

17

term issues to the principals involved.

18

their licenses quite vigorously because of the fact that all

19

of the principals involved, whether it be a small LLC like

20

this one or a fairly good sized incorporated bodies take care

21

not to get their licenses revoked if they can possibly help

22

it, because they can't - no one can reapply for a three year

23

period of time.

24

that as being something you want to protect and take issue

25

with if you feel that you've been wronged.

The

And revocations are

And people defend

And if that's your livelihood, you look to

Your Honor, 24

THE COURT:
MS. PAGE:

Defending - I don't think that Mr. Thomas

Sarafolean is a party to these proceedings, and he certainly
could have been made a party.
existence.

Mr. Gubler knew about his

I don't think the rest of us knew that he had

this interest in this proceeding, and THE COURT:

With that said about the - now, I've

lost my train - but the point before you just closed.
MS. PAGE:
THE COURT:

About Mr. Sarafolean?
No, before that.

Oh, what does the

representation by Mr. Gubler now that his client has
voluntarily relinquished his license?

What does that - does

that have any affect on you at all, and how do you respond to
that?
MS. PAGE:

Well, the fact that he's surrendered his

license - the department - it - the practical affect on the
public is nil.- I mean, there's a business that had a license
that no longer has a license.
THE COURT:
MS. PAGE:

Yeah, but...
The Division gets to decide whether or

not they will accept or - as a voluntary surrender.

Because

quite honestly, I have cases where - the revocations are
pending, and the people want to just surrender their license
to get out from underneath it.

That three year, you know,

issue that can cause them problems with future licenses or
25

1

other licenses that they may hold, but the fact that he's out

2

of the business doesn't terminate the jurisdiction of both

3

the agency and the court.

4

business, and if leaves the business and he has debts owing,

5

then he has a bond that will do for people to a particular

6

payment.

7

Practically, he is out of

But the fact of the matter is, is that Gerry

8

Sarafolean is Rugby Pub.

9

the owner.

He was an employee, but he's also

And we insist that people give us a name and a

10

person that you can contact because you have to be able to

11

work with an individual, and Mr. Sara - Gerry Sarafolean is

12

the person who is and was Rugby Pub.

13

THE COURT:

14

Mr. Gubler?

15

MR. GUBLER:

Thank you, Ms. Page.

Well, Your Honor, I think Ms. Page
June 11th,

16

clearly and simply misrepresents the facts.

17

there's a letter from Zurich, who's the bonding company to

18

Thomas Sarafolean saying, Mr. Sarafolean, the surety below

19

issue alcohol liquor tax bond in behalf of Rugby Pub here and

20

receipt of the enclose correspondence received from the State

21

of Utah making demand under the terms of the bond for the

22

payment of $1,168.33.

23

been given notice that he's going to have to pay some money

24

right here -

25

THE COURT:

First time Mr. Thomas Sarafolean's

And that's who?

The bonding company
26

1
2

that he purchased the bond from?
MR. GUBLER:

Yeah.

Yeah, yep.

He said, you know,

3

the bonding company was notified on June - I think June 9th

4

or June 10th.

5

going to attach the bond.

6

through the papers and the on-premise beer bond was issued in

7

the name of Thomas Sarafolean, which is - his name appears

8

there on the application and also appears on the Utah

9

Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control application for

The letter was sent out from DABC saying we're
I think the fact that I've gone

10

non-tavern, on-premise beer license.

11

Thomas Sarafolean was due some notice on these proceedings,

12

and Ms. Page is just barely admitted that at no point in time

13

was Thomas Sarafolean notified, joined in the action, or

14

given any chance to respond, period.

15

THE COURT:

And so I think clearly,

Well, not from the department, because

16

there is no - I can see what the bonding company would give

17

Thomas Sarafolean notice, because he apparently, contracted

18

with the bonding company, but unless and until there was some

19

notice to the Department that Thomas Sarafolean was involved

20

in this matter rather than Gerald Sarafolean, why should they

21

send out notice to a Thomas Sarafolean?

22

MR. GUBLER:

What more do they need?

The

23

application was signed by Thomas J. Sarafolean.

What - who -

24

I mean, do they need to send someone down to say, look,

25

Thomas needs to be notified when the Utah Department 27

on-premise beer bond was issued based on an application?
Because the application was in the name of Thomas J.
Sarafolean.

The contact person, Gerald Sarafolean, but

Thomas' address is listed here.
them is from the bond company?
some money?
action.

The first time he hears from
We're coming after you for

We never served you with notice of the agency

We never did any of that.

So the first time he has

the right to say, hey, I don't like this is when the bond
company contacts him on June 11th.
don't like it.

It's not fair.

And he said, bologna.

I

In fact, they've gone outside

their own penalty schedule, and they've penalized us
severely.
THE COURT:
interesting issues.

Thank you both for a well argued and
I'll take them under advisement and get

something shortly.
MS. PAGE:
THE COURT:
MR. GUBLER:

Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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